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Abstract. In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism de-
sign problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers.
Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of
valuations used by the seller. However, in certain applications, no prior
information regarding buyers’ preferences is known. To address this is-
sue, we consider uncertain valuations and formulate the problem in a
robust optimization framework: the objective is to minimize the maxi-
mum regret. For a special case of revenue-maximizing pricing problem we
present a solution method based on mixed-integer linear programming
formulation.
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1 Introduction
We consider the following setup with a monopolist seller who wants to sell a set
of substitutable items to a group of buyers. Each buyer has their own preferences
over the offered items, and has a fixed demand. Each item is unique, and thus can
be sold to one buyer (this is without the loss of generality, since the seller may be
offering for sale several copies of the same item). The seller wants to determine
the prices of items in order to maximize his revenue. However, his knowledge of
buyers’ preferences is limited. Indeed, the item valuations are private information
of each buyer, who may want to strategically misreport them in order to receive
items ahead of the others, or simply pay less than certain item is worth (according
to the buyers’ knowledge). In problems of this kind it is usually assumed that
the seller has some probabilistic model of buyers’ preferences, and wants to
maximize his expected revenue, subject to the information he can extract from
the available data. However, in many practical situations it is not possible to
have any reliable statistical data to build such a model. Instead, a risk-averse
seller may want to assume as little as possible about buyers’ preferences, but
enough to obtain a profit from the sale. One reasonable approach, motivated by
a firm axiomatic basis [1, 2], is to use robust optimization approach and assign
prices to the items, so that the maximum regret of the revenue is minimized. We
examine this approach in this paper for the considered combinatorial mechanism
design problem.
1.1 Related Work
The contribution of the paper would be summarized by contrasting it with the
following related well-established research areas.
Combinatorial Auctions. In combinatorial auctions buyers are described
by valuation functions v(S), where S is a subset of items that seller has in the
offer [3]. Typically, the goal of the auction is to allocate subsets of items to the
buyers so that the sum of resulting utilities (the total welfare) is maximized.
The computed allocation is a function of bids given by all buyers. A good design
incentivizes truthful bidding. Combinatorial auction model is similar to the one
presented in this paper, however, we consider not only the allocation problem,
but also the problem of determining prices that maximize seller’s revenue. More-
over, while combinatorial auction model allows for very general model of utility
based on subsets of items, in this paper we consider a specific class of utility
functions based on multidimensional valuation vectors.
Multidimensional Mechanism Design. The problem considered in this
paper is motivated by the works [4–7] and others, that build on the ideas initiated
in [8]. In [9] a similar setup to ours is also presented, but with buyers’ types being
single-dimensional, and utility functions defined on subsets of items.
However, the Bayesian approach proposed in these works is not adequate
for the setup of interest in this paper. In particular, the Bayesian approach
requires prior beliefs on buyers’ valuations and/or historical data for parameter
estimation. These assumptions do not always hold in practice, especially when
a set of new products is introduced to the market, or the seller offers goods that
are unique for the given buyers. Consequently, the robust mechanism design has
already been proposed in recent publications [10–13]. However, these prior works
focus on single item pricing, and to the best of our knowledge, min-max regret
approach has not yet been applied to the multidimensional mechanism design
for discrete goods. This paper investigates an approach that is complimentary
to the Bayesian analysis, when robustness of solutions is needed.
2 Problem Formulation
In this section we give definitions of optimal combinatorial mechanism design
and pricing problems for discrete substitutable items.
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a seller which has M substitutable items for sale, and N concurrent
buyers, each with demand forDi ≤M items. Each buyer is described by a vector
of type xi ∈ Ω ⊂ RM , where xij is ith buyer’s valuation of jth item.
A (direct-revelation) mechanism is a pair of functions (φ, ψ), where ψ maps
a profile of buyers’ valuations X = (x1, . . . ,xN ) into a matrix of allocations
of items Q = (q1, . . . ,qN ), and φ maps allocations of items Q into the vector
of payments p that each ith buyer makes for receiving items according to the
allocation Q. Function φ is called the payment function, and ψ is called the
allocation function.
In this paper we only consider mechanisms of a specific kind. The allowed
allocation matrices Q are only such that each buyer receives up to Di items, and
each item is assigned to up to a single buyer. Formally, ψ : ΩN → Q, where:
Q = {Q ∈ {0, 1}MN :
N∑
i=1
qij ≤ 1,
M∑
j=1
qij ≤ Di}.
Moreover, prices of items are independent of the buyer’s index, thus the payment
function φ : Q → RN+ can be defined by a vector p = (p1, . . . , pM ), so that
φ(Q) = (φ1(Q), . . . , φN (Q)), where:
φi(Q) =
N∑
j=1
pjqij .
The seller’s revenue is defined as the sum of payments all the buyers make, given
the type profile X:
r(p, ψ;X) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
pjψij(X).
Buyer’s utility is defined by a quasi-linear function: ui(p,qi,xi) = qi · (xi − p).
A mechanism is called incentive-compatible (IC), if the allocations corresponding
to the true valuations maximize utilities of each buyer. Then a dominant strategy
of each buyer is to report his true (private) valuations to the seller. Formally,
mechanism (p, ψ) is IC if:
∀i ∀x′∈Ω ui(p, ψi(X),xi) ≥ ui(p, ψi(x
′,X−i),xi),
which in the considered case is equivalent to:
∀i ∀x′∈Ω (ψi(X)− ψi(x
′,X−i)) · (xi − p) ≥ 0. (1)
Notation (x′,X−i) denotes the matrix X with i-th column xi replaced with x
′.
It is further assumed that buyers are individually rational (IR), which means
that they participate in the mechanism only when the utility gained is at least
equal to a certain threshold ui,0:
∀i ui(p, ψi(X),xi) ≥ ui,0. (2)
Henceforth, we normalize the threshold for all buyers to zero, i.e., ui,0 = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , N . We denote the set of all feasible mechanisms by:
M =
{
(p, ψ) : p ∈ RM+ , ∀X∈ΩN ψ(X) ∈ Q and satisfy (1) and (2)
}
. (3)
2.2 Robust Mechanism Design
We assume that vectors of buyers’ types are not known to the seller. Instead,
there is a known set of possible type scenarios S ⊂ ΩN . Two most widely
considered special cases of S are discrete scenario sets and interval uncertainty
sets. The discrete scenario set is defined as S = {X(1), . . . ,X(S)}. The interval
uncertainty set is defined as S = {[x−ij , x
+
ij ] ⊂ R+ : i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,M}.
For a fixed scenario X ∈ S the regret of a mechanism (p, ψ) is defined as:
R(p, ψ;X) =
(
max
(p′,ψ′)∈M
r(p′, ψ′;X)
)
− r(p, ψ;X),
i.e., the difference between the revenue generated by an optimal mechanism for
known valuations X, and the revenue generated by the mechanism (p, ψ). The
objective of the seller is to determine a mechanism (p∗, ψ∗) that minimizes the
maximum regret over the set of scenarios:
(p∗, ψ∗) ∈ arg min
(p,ψ)∈M
max
X∈S
R(p, ψ;X). (4)
The problem of finding an optimal robust mechanism (4) can be seen as
three-level optimization problem, in which we minimize (over the space of all
feasible mechanisms) the objective function involving unconstrained optimiza-
tion over the set of all type profiles X ∈ S, with objective function that contains
a term involving constrained optimization of revenue for a fixed type profile
(again over the space of all feasible mechanisms). The innermost sub-problem of
finding revenue-maximizing prices and allocations is usually referred to as the
deterministic problem, as it assumes fixed X given as an input. The outermost
problem will be referred to as the robust problem.
Similarly to the Bayesian variant of the multidimensional mechanism design,
the robust version of the problem is difficult to solve. Since we model buyers’
valuations using subsets of multidimensional real space, the set (3) of feasible
mechanisms (p, ψ) contains allocations ψ expressed as functions on possibly con-
tinuous domain. This makes the problem (4) a functional optimization problem
(this is also the case of general optimal mechanism design problem [4]). Note
that, given the total function solution ψ, the seller would be able to optimally
assign items for all buyers’ types X ∈ ΩN , and that would cover also non-truth
telling buyers (which do not comply to the incentive-compatibility assumption).
2.3 Robust Pricing
Instead of computing an optimal robust mechanism, in some applications it may
be enough for the seller to determine only an optimal robust set of prices. In this
slightly simplified solution concept, buyers’ reported types will not map directly
into an allocation rule. Instead, reported types may be the basis for constructing
the uncertainty set S, given as an input to the seller. If buyers are aware of the
fact that the seller will price the items so that each buyer can receive their
utility-maximizing item, truth telling will remain to be an equilibrium strategy.
Note that in this approach the solution is also more resistant to the buyers’
types misreporting caused by their inherent uncertainty of item valuations (i.e.,
non-strategic misreporting).
It is enough to consider unit demands Di = 1 for all buyers i = 1, . . . , N ,
since if in the original problem a buyer have arbitrary demand Di > 1, we
substitute them with Di identical buyers of unit demands. Consequently, we can
assume that matrix X is square. Thus if there are less items than buyers we add
zero-value dummy items, and interpret matching a dummy item to buyer as not
allocating any items to that buyer. If there are less buyers than items we add
all-zero valuations buyers, and interpret assigning to such a buyer as not selling
an item. Let K = max{M,N}.
Consequently, the optimal (deterministic) pricing problem can be defined for
any X ∈ ΩK as the follows:
max
p≥0,Q∈Q
r(p,Q), (5)
subject to:
∀i ∀j
K∑
k=1
qjk(xjk − pk) ≥
K∑
k=1
qik(xjk − pk), (6)
∀j
K∑
k=1
qjk(xjk − pk) ≥ 0, (7)
where r(p,Q) =
∑N
i=1 p · qi is the revenue.
Constraint (6) forces the assignment of items to be utility-maximizing for
each buyer. The problem (5)–(7) is a mixed-integer nonlinear program. Intro-
ducing new variables ui, and substituting them for each ith buyer’s utility
ui =
∑K
k=1 qik(xik − pk), we can transform the nonlinear formulation into a
mixed-integer linear one as follows:
max
u≥0,Q∈F(u,X)
K∑
i=1

 K∑
j=1
qijxij − ui

 , (8)
where:
F(u,X) = {Q ∈ Q : ∀i, ∀j uj − ui ≥
K∑
k=1
qik(xjk − xik)}. (9)
The equivalence of the constraint sets given by (6)–(7) and F can be seen by
observing that the lefthand side of (6) is equal to uj , thus by subtracting ui
from both sides of this constraint, and expanding the right-hand side, we obtain
the inequality defining (9). We note that this new constraint is a special case of
more general condition that incentive-compatible allocations must correspond to
utility functions that are convex continuous (see, e.g., [5]). These inequalities are
a discretized equivalent of the convexity constraint imposed on utility functions.
Constraint (7) becomes a standard non-negativity constraint u ≥ 0. Given op-
timal solution (u∗,Q∗), the vector of optimal prices p∗ can be computed from
the definition of utility.
Before we give the robust formulation of this problem, we need to observe that
the feasibility of a particular solution (u,Q) depends on the actual scenario X.
Most notions of robustness require that solution should be given before the true
scenario is realized [14]. Consequently, we will require from the robust solution
that it is unconditionally feasible, that is, regardless of the scenario. Formally,
solution must be robust feasible, i.e., from the set:
R =
⋂
X∈S
{(u,Q) : u ≥ 0, Q ∈ F(u,X)}.
Note that in many cases robust feasible solutions require that not every item
is sold, i.e., matrix Q does not have a full rank. The robust formulation of the
pricing problem is the following:
min
(u,Q)∈R
max
X∈S

 max
(u′,Q′)∈F(u′,X)
K∑
i=1

 K∑
j=1
q′ijxij − u
′
i

−
K∑
i=1

 K∑
j=1
qijxij + ui



 .
(10)
3 Solution Method for Interval Uncertainty
In this section we present an algorithm for solving (10) for the interval uncer-
tainty case of valuations set S = {[x−ij , x
+
ij ] : i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}}. The algorithm is
based on Benders cut generation method. It makes use of the mixed-integer lin-
ear program for deterministic pricing problem (8)–(9). A similar solution method
was used for the robust assignment problem in [15], however problem (10) intro-
duces additional constraints on feasible assignments.
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Let A ← ∅, LB ← −∞, UB ← +∞.
2. Solve:
min
Q∈Q,u≥0,θ≥0

θ −
K∑
i=1

 K∑
j=1
qijx
−
ij − ui



 ,
subject to:
∀i,j uj − ui ≥
K∑
k=1
qik(x
+
jk − x
−
ik)
and:
∀(u′,Q′)∈A θ ≥
K∑
i=1

 K∑
j=1
q′ij
(
x+ij + (x
−
ij − x
+
ij)qij
)
− u′i

 .
Let (uˆ, Qˆ, θˆ) be an optimal solution, and vˆ be the value of this solution.
3. If vˆ > LB then LB ← vˆ.
4. Solve the deterministic problem (8)–(9) for scenario:
xij =
{
x−ij , qˆij = 1,
x+ij , qˆij = 0.
Let (u¯, Q¯) be an optimal solution.
5. Compute value v˜ of solution (uˆ, Qˆ, u¯, Q¯) for (10). If v˜ < UB then UB ← v˜.
6. If UB ≤ LB then STOP.
7. Add (u¯, Q¯) to the set A and go to Step 2.
The procedure starts from relaxing constraints that define set F(u,Q), re-
stricting the solution to be robust feasible, (u,Q) ∈ R. An initial solution is
found by optimizing the relaxed problem. Such a solution, however, is usually
not feasible for the problem (10), but only provides a lower bound (variable LB).
However, given this solution, we determine the worst-case scenarioX ∈ S, which
is an extreme scenario, consisting of only lower or upper interval bounds for each
valuation. A deterministic pricing problem (8)–(9) is then solved for that worst-
case scenario, which corresponds to the inner maximization sub-problem in (10).
However, since it is computed only for one particular choice of optimization vari-
ables (u,Q), the solution of this sub-problem gives only a lower bound on the
first term in the objective function of (10), which is represented by a new opti-
mization variable θ. Given a solution of the sub-problem, we obtain a feasible
solution of (10), which provides an upper bound on an optimal one (variable
UB). We create a Benders cut from the solution of the sub-problem, and add
its indexing variable to the set A. Note that in order to completely describe the
feasible set of (10) we would require all robust feasible solutions to be contained
in A. But then A would have exponential size. However, it is very often that
most of these constraints are superfluous, and an optimal solution of (10) can be
found by taking only very small fraction of these constraints into consideration.
3.1 Experimental Results
For an experimental evaluation we have prepared interval uncertainty sets S by
randomly generating lower bounds of valuations uniformly from range [x−min, x
−
max],
and then for the corresponding upper bound by adding number uniformly from
range [0, ∆], independently for each buyer and item pair. Table 1 shows the sum-
mary of results. Problem instances were solved using cut-generating algorithm
described in the previous section. For each problem size K the values given are
averaged over 10 repetitions of experiment. Columns contain, respectively: the
problem size (number of buyers and items), value of an optimal regret, revenue
generated by robust optimal solution, resulting welfare (sum of buyers’ utilities),
number of items sold in the robust optimal solution, and approximate compu-
tation time in seconds. Solutions for K ≤ 30 are optimal with absolute error
allowed 0.05. Solutions for K ≥ 40 were computed with time limit of 1 hour,
and in most cases no optimal solution was found until then, thus results for
best feasible solutions are reported. In a vast majority of cases it was enough to
generate only 2–4 cuts in order to find a robust optimal solution.
Notice that for a large number of items and competing buyers the revenue
generated by robust solutions starts to decrease, after reaching its highest level.
We may conclude that, depending on the range of uncertainty sets, there is a
certain number of items that the seller should try to sell concurrently, in order to
safely profit from the competition between buyers. However, above that threshold
the buyers’ utilities quickly decrease and so the guaranteed revenue drops down
(indicated by a robust solution), thus it is best to reduce the size of the product
line.
Table 1. Experimental results. Highest values of average revenue generated by robust
solutions are marked in bold.
K optimal regret robust revenue robust welfare sold items time
x
−
min
= 10, x−max = 500, ∆ = 30
5 111.27 1452.45 133.72 4.18 11.94
10 623.27 3518.00 96.00 7.91 17.79
20 3116.27 5687.00 72.00 12.00 287.04
30 7464.82 6393.45 57.64 13.27 7565.10
40 13324.82 5505.18 19.09 11.27 10946.47
50 18785.75 5282.00 11.00 10.75 10262.33
x
−
min
= 10, x−max = 500, ∆ = 50
5 200.09 1390.00 84.18 3.73 11.73
10 1148.73 3037.36 116.18 6.91 16.60
20 5024.36 4012.45 50.18 8.45 203.89
30 10534.55 3660.55 15.55 7.55 8451.96
40 16941.36 2349.09 9.54 4.81 8452.51
50 22709.09 1876.00 0.45 3.82 10433.85
x
−
min
= 100, x−max = 500, ∆ = 50
5 284.27 1453.27 90.55 3.73 13.18
10 1611.36 2736.64 80.36 6.09 14.11
20 6126.09 3161.00 28.00 6.55 145.86
30 12098.45 2365.91 2.91 4.82 6733.55
40 17864.73 1695.55 2.91 3.45 9937.67
50 23881.71 987.43 0.00 2.00 10466.73
x
−
min
= 100, x−max = 1000, ∆ = 50
5 175.82 2937.45 269.91 4.27 10.94
10 742.64 7422.36 329.09 8.55 15.97
20 5437.09 12043.00 218.09 12.82 361.68
30 12198.00 15526.60 159.10 16.10 9316.22
40 24506.00 12933.67 54.33 13.33 9345.68
50 31608.00 6151.00 86.00 16.50 10804.96
3.2 Algorithm for Deterministic Sub-Problem
Finally, we present a fast heuristic for solving sub-problem (8)–(9) for a fixed
type profile. It can be used as a sub-routine in the outer problem of minimizing
the maximum regret, when the problem size is prohibitive for applying exact
algorithm from the previous subsection. Note that this problem can be also solved
directly using mixed-integer linear programming. The presented procedure is
based on solving assignment problem, using e.g., Hungarian algorithm [16].
Observe that the revenue-maximizing item allocation is upper-bounded by
the value of maximum weight matching of items to buyers. Indeed, if Q ∈ Q
is one-to-one matching, and pj is the price of jth item for some (unique) buyer
i, such that Qij = 1, then the revenue Q · p is also the value of the matching.
However, the vector of prices p corresponding to the maximum weight matching
may violate constraints defining (9). The idea of solution algorithm is to adjust
the prices so that to make sure that these constraints are satisfied, while at the
same time keeping the assumed allocation Q corresponding to the maximum
weight matching. Note however, that such allocation may not be optimal for any
choice of prices p.
The algorithm is the following:
1. Find a maximum weight assignment for the matrix X of buyers’ valuation
profile (each column xi corresponds to buyer’s i valuations, and each row
XTj corresponds to an item j). Denote the matching by permutation matrix
A.
2. Let p ← (p1, . . . , pM ), where pj = xij , such that Aij = 1 for some i =
1, . . . , N .
3. For each buyer n = 1, . . . , N :
(a) Let Ui be the utility of matched item j0, i.e., U = xij0 − pj0 , where
Aij0 = 1.
(b) Let Uˆi be the maximum utility of buyer i given the current prices, i.e.,
Uˆi = xij′ − pj′ , where j′ maximizes {xij − pj : j = 1, . . . ,M}. Here j′ is
the item that client prefers under the current prices.
(c) If Uˆi > Ui then pj0 ← pj0 − Uˆi − Ui.
(d) If pj0 < 0 or Uj0 < 0 set Aij0 = 0 (i.e., item j0 is not sold).
4. Check if Uˆi = Ui for all buyers i = 1, . . . , N . If not, then go to Step 3.
The procedure can be further improved. For example, assignment matrix A
can be recomputed when initial item match turns out to be infeasible for a given
buyer in Step 3d (in a new valuation matrix we would set the buyer’s valuation
of that item to zero).
4 Conclusions and Further Work
The problem of optimal mechanism design, while relatively easy for single-dimensional
types, becomes more difficult to solve in the case of multidimensional type space
and specific constraints regarding allowed allocations of goods. Different formu-
lations using Bayesian models of valuation uncertainty are subject to active
ongoing research. In this paper we presented formulation in which no prior be-
liefs regarding multidimensional valuations are assumed, and the objective is
to design a robust mechanism in a min-max regret sense. We provided a cut-
generation based algorithm for solving a special case of pricing mechanism for
interval uncertainty.
There are many directions of interesting further research. One is to assume
budget-constrained buyers with arbitrary demands. Then we would obtain a
formulation of the deterministic problem that contains a generalized assignment
problem as a special case, thus the problem becomes even more complex. Another
idea is to introduce a regulated monopoly: in such case it is required to design a
mechanism that maximizes a weighted sum of seller’s revenue and buyers’ welfare.
Finally, more efficient solution algorithms would allow to extend the range of
possible practical applications for the class of mechanisms under consideration.
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